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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Scott Hansen asserts that the district court erred in denying him his fundamental 
right to allocute during sentencing, and his case must be remanded for resentencing. 
He further contends that his sentence represents an abuse of the district court's 
discretion because it is excessive. Mr. Hansen also contends that the fact that the 
district court relinquished its retained jurisdiction based on evidence of Mr. Hansen's 
performance in less than 60 days in the rider program and without a hearing is patently 
unreasonable and represents an abuse of discretion. He further contends that the 
district court abused its discretion in failing to reduce his sentence in light of the 
additional information submitted in conjunction with Mr. Hansen's Idaho Criminal Rule 
35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion. 1 
The State claims that this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear Mr. Hansen's 
assertion that the district court violated Mr. Hansen's due process rights, that because 
Mr. Hansen did not object to the denial of his right to allocute it may not be considered 
for the first time on appeal, and that Mr. Hansen cannot establish fundamental error 
under State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2008). This Reply Brief is necessary to address 
the State's inaccurate claims pertaining to Mr. Hansen's assertion that he was denied 
the right to allocute. 
1 The arguments in support of Mr. Hansen's assertions that the district court abused its 
discretion by imposing an excessive sentence, relinquishing jurisdiction over him, and 
denying his Rule 35 motion are adequately presented in his Appellant's Brief and are 
not discussed further herein. 
1 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Hansen's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief in 
detail, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
2 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court violate Mr. Hansen's rights of due process when it did not 
allow him to allocute before he was sentenced? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of 
eight years, with two years fixed, upon Mr. Hansen following his plea of guilty to 
statutory rape? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over 
Mr. Hansen? 
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Hansen's Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 Motion for a Reduction of Sentence in light of the additional 
information offered in his supporting affidavit? 
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ARGUMENT 
By Not Allowing Mr. Hansen To Make A Statement Of Allocution During Sentencing, 
The District Court Violated Mr. Hansen's Due Process Rights 
A. Introduction 
At sentencing, the district court advised Mr. Hansen as follows: 
THE COURT: Before I decide what to do in this case, Mr. Hansen, I'll afford 
you an opportunity to make a statement on your own behalf or to present to me 
any evidence or information in mitigation in an effort to lessen any punishment I 
might otherwise impose. You can do that yourself, through your lawyer, through 
witnesses, or any combination of the same. 
(9/19/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.14-20.) Shortly thereafter, Mr. Hansen's counsel advised the 
district court that Mr. Hansen had prepared such a statement: "I know that my client 
does have a statement .... " (9/19/11 Tr., p.6, Ls.1-2.) 
Yet the district court failed to ask Mr. Hansen if he would like to make a 
statement on his own behalf prior to pronouncing Mr. Hansen's sentence. This was 
error, and a denial of Mr. Hansen's right to due process. 
B. The Court Has Jurisdiction To Consider Mr. Hansen's Due Process Claim 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State claims that Mr. Hansen's assertion of his right 
to allocute is untimely under I.A.R. 14(a). The State's argument is without merit. 
On September 19, 2011, Mr. Hansen was sentenced to two years fixed, plus six 
years determinate, for a unified sentence of eight years. (R., pp.62-63.) The district 
court retained jurisdiction for 365 days. (R., p.63.) On December 27, 2011, the district 
court relinquished jurisdiction without a hearing. (R., pp.69-70.) On February 7, 2012, 
Mr. Hansen filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Order Relinquishing 
Jurisdiction. (R., pp.72-73.) Mr. Hansen also filed a timely Idaho Criminal Rule 35 
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(hereinafter, Rule 35) motion on February 9, 2012. (R., pp.81-82.) Mr. Hansen's Rule 
35 motion was denied on February 15, 2012 without a hearing. (R., pp.91-95.) 
Mr. Hansen is appealing his sentence. Mr. Hansen contends that the denial of 
his right to allocute resulted in his sentence being imposed in violation of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution, and Idaho Criminal Rule 33(a); stated another way, that his sentence was 
imposed in an illegal manner. 
In State v. Gervasi, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that even in the absence of 
an objection at sentencing, a defendant claiming a denial of the right of allocution may 
raise the claim either in a timely filed Rule 35 motion for correction of sentence imposed 
in an illegal manner, or for the first time in a timely filed appeal from the judgment and 
sentence. State v. Gervasi, 138 Idaho 813, 816, n.1 (Ct. App. 2003). Thus the denial 
of the right to allocute is an issue with the sentence; it represents an illegal manner of 
imposing a sentence, and the Court of Appeals in Gervasi acknowledged that there are 
two avenues through which a defendant may seek to address this issue. See id. Here, 
the State conceded that Mr. Hansen has timely appealed his sentence, "this Court has 
jurisdiction to address Hansen's challenge to 'the sentence contained in the criminal 
judgment'." (Respondent's Brief, p.4.) As Mr. Hansen has timely appealed from his 
sentence in this manner by the State's own admission, and this is a sentencing issue, 
the Court has jurisdiction to determine this issue. 
C. Denial Of The Right To Allocution May Be Raised For The First Time On Appeal 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State claims that Mr. Hansen's failure to object to 
the district court's denial of his right to allocute means that this Court is precluded from 
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hearing the argument for the first time on appeal. The State's argument is without merit, 
as it ignores the Court of Appeals' decision in Gervasi, a case that specifically dealt with 
the denial of a defendant's right to allocute. 
As a general rule, issues must be raised in the trial court in order to be 
considered on appeal. State v. Smith, 130 Idaho 450, 454 (Ct. App. 1997). However, 
the Idaho Court of Appeals in Gervasi concluded that denial of a defendant's right to 
allocution may be raised for the first time on appeal, regardless of whether it was 
objected to at sentencing. Gervasi, 138 Idaho at 816. Thus, it was not necessary for 
Mr. Hansen to object to the denial of his right to allocute at the time of his sentencing on 
September 19, 2011, in order to preserve his right to appeal this issue. 
D. Mr. Hansen Has Shown Fundamental Error Under The Perry Standard 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State claims that Mr. Hansen is unable to show 
fundamental error by the district court in its denial of his right to allocute. The State's 
argument is without merit. 
The State claims that the right to allocute is not a constitutional right and, 
therefore, the fundamental error standard articulated in Perry cannot be met. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.5-6.) Although the United States Supreme Court recognized 
the importance of the right to allocute in Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 
(1961), the following year it concluded in Hill v. United States, that a judge's failure to 
ask a defendant if he had anything to say was not a constitutional error. Hill v. United 
States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962) (holding that trial court's failure to ask defendant whether 
he had anything to say was not constitutional error when defendant did not request an 
opportunity to speak, did not suggest the district judge was uninformed as to relevant 
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circumstances, and did not claim he would have had anything to say). Green and Hill 
left open the question of whether a defendant who asks the court to speak has a right to 
do so that is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. See Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523, 1527 (9th Cir. 1992). In 
McGautha v. California, the United States Supreme Court assumed without deciding 
that the Constitution does require the defendant be permitted to speak at sentencing if 
he so requests, but the Court has thus far declined to determine whether or to what 
extent due process requires that at criminal defendant wishing to present evidence or 
argument at sentencing should be allowed to do so. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 
183,218-219 (1971) (vacated in part on other grounds by Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 
941 (1972)) (noting that the Supreme Court had not since Hill had an occasion to 
address whether silencing a defendant who wished to speak rose to the level of a 
constitutional violation). 
However, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that the right of allocution is a 
constitutional, due process right. See Boardman v. Estelle, 957 F.2d 1523 (9th Cir. 
1992) (holding that a defendant has been denied due process when his request to be 
permitted to speak to the trial court before sentencing is denied); United States v. 
Biagon, 510 F.3d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that "[a] sentencing court does not 
deny a defendant's constitutional right of allocution by declining a general request to 
close a courtroom for sentencing") (emphasis added); United States v. Carper, 24 F.3d 
1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Boardman that 
allocution is a constitutional due process right). The Ninth Circuit has held that "[d]ue 
process requires that a defendant who seeks to speak must be given such an 
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opportunity before a sentence is imposed." United States v. Silva, 472 F.3d 683, 687 
(9th Cir. 2007) (citing Boardman, 957 F.2d at 1524). 
In Boardman, the Ninth Circuit reversed the denial of a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus by a prisoner. 957 F.2d 1523. The Ninth Circuit examined Hill, and 
noted that it left open the question of whether a defendant who is affirmatively denied an 
opportunity to speak during his sentencing hearing has a constitutionally guaranteed 
right to do so. Id. 957 F.2d at 1527. In Boardman, the Ninth Circuit specifically held 
that, when a defendant asks to speak, but is denied the opportunity, the right of 
allocution was a right protected by the due process clause of the United States 
Constitution. Id. 957 F.2d at 1530. 
Not only does the Ninth Circuit recognize that the Fourteenth Amendment 
dictates that a defendant receive a right of allocution,2 but Idaho law also finds a 
constitutional basis for the right of allocution. See State v. Nez, 130 Idaho 950, 958 
(Ct. App. 1997). 
In State v. Nez, the Court of Appeals recognized "the constitutional importance of 
the right of allocution." 130 Idaho 950, 958 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the right to 
allocution is not implicated in probation revocation proceedings because the sentence 
has already been established). The Court of Appeals in Nez examined the decision by 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Boardman. The Court in Nez relied on the Ninth 
Circuit's holding in Boardman: "allocution is a right guaranteed by the due process 
clause of the Constitution." Nez, 130 Idaho at 958. However, Nez was a case involving 
2 The Fourth Circuit has also held that the denial of a defendant's request to allocute to 
the sentencing court was a denial of due process. Ashe v. North Carolina, 586 F.2d 
334 (4th Cir.1978), cert. denied441 U.S. 966 (1979). 
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the right to allocution at a probation revocation hearing, thus the Court in Nez found that 
in cases of probation revocation hearings, I.C.R. 33 does not apply and, thus, the court 
is not required to allow the defendant an opportunity to allocute. Id. 130 Idaho at 959. 
The Court did note, in dicta, that the opportunity for allocution is the preferred practice in 
all sentencing situations. Id. 130 Idaho at 958. 
Although the Ninth Circuit limited its holding in Boardman to those cases in which 
the defendant requested an opportunity to allocute, similarly, Mr. Hansen's counsel 
affirmatively advised the district court that Mr. Hansen had prepared a statement and 
planned to speak to the court on his own behalf. (9/19/11 Tr., p.6, Ls.1-2.) Further, the 
district court advised Mr. Hansen that it would "afford him an opportunity to make a 
statement on [his] own behalf." (9/19/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.14-16.) Additionally, the Idaho 
Court of Appeals in GervasP noted that although a denial of allocution has not 
affirmatively been held to constitute a due process denial under the United States 
Constitution, "states are free to provide greater protections than those afforded at the 
federal level." Gervasi, 138 Idaho at 816 (holding that the right to allocute is a 
fundamental right) (citing State v. Donato, 135 Idaho 469 (2001) (analyzing whether the 
Idaho Constitution provided greater protections than the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution)). Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that because the 
Court noted that the State of Idaho provides greater protections for allocution than the 
United States Constitution, that the right of allocution is a constitutional right under 
Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. In support of this conclusion, the Court in 
3 Although Gervasi and Nez were both decided pre-Perry, Perry did not overrule 
allocution case law but merely clarified Idaho's fundamental error doctrine. State v. 
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2008). 
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Gervasi likened the duty of the court under Rule 33(a)(1) to allow an opportunity for 
allocution to the requirement under Rule 11 that the trial court inform the defendant of 
his or her right against compulsory self-incrimination, right to trial by jury, and right to 
confront witnesses against himself. Id. The Court thusly indicated that the right to 
allocute was synonymous with established constitutional rights, and implied that Idaho 
recognized the right of allocution as a constitutional right. 
Under Idaho Criminal Rule 33(a), the due process clause of the United States 
Constitution, and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution, the district court was 
required to allow Mr. Hansen an opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf. As 
discussed in his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Hansen's counsel advised the district court that 
Mr. Hansen did wish to make such a statement to the court. (See Appellant's Brief at p. 
6.) The record is clear that Mr. Hansen was not asked by the district court at sentencing 
whether he wished to make a statement. (See generally 9/19/11 Tr.) 
Therefore, a remand for resentencing is warranted to allow him the opportunity to 
speak on his own behalf. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Hansen respectfully requests that this Court remand his case to the district 
court with instructions to hold a new sentencing hearing to allow Mr. Hansen his right of 
allocution. 
DATED this 5th day of December, 2012. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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